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Karesh: Security Transactions
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
COLZMAN ICARIsH*

MORTGAGES
Defense Against One Not Holder in Due Course
The case of South Orange Trust Company v. Conner' was one involving the foreclosure of a mortgage. The principal issues were
those concerned with agency and negotiable paper, and on their resolution depended the ultimate issue of the enforceability of the mortgage. The defense was that the note and mortgage had been procured by fraud on the part of one alleged to be the plaintiff's agent.
The counter-contention of the plaintiff was that it was an innocent
assignee or holder in due course. The evidence was against this
contention, however: a finding that the fraud was committed by an
agent was sustained on appeal, with the result that the plaintiff, not
having qualified as an innocent holder, could not foreclose the mort2
gage.
Res Judicata as to Foreclosure Action
In Antrum v. Hentsville Production Credit Assn.8 the doctrine of
res judicata was held to bar a mortgagor who sought to set aside a
foreclosure sale. The mortgagor had defaulted in pleading to the
complaint for foreclosure and had allowed the mortgaged property
to go to sale. On a rule to show cause for the issuance of a writ of
assistance to put the purchaser in possession the mortgagor resisted
the writ on the ground of alleged impropriety in the sale and was
overruled without a hearing on the merits. From this there was no
appeal. Thereafter the mortgagor brought this proceeding to have
the sale vacated, alleging again the impropriety of the sale and also
asserting fraud in the mortgage and other possible defenses. The
court, affirming the lower court, held that the earlier proceedings
down through the writ were res judicata not only as to issues actually raised but as to those which might have been raised in the action.
With respect to the latter, it is stated "While the doctrine [res ju0
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1. 228 S.C. 218, 89 S.E. 2d 372 (1955).
2. The cases are numerous in which unenforceability has attended a mortgage securing negotiable paper in the hands of one who, for one reason or
another, could not qualify as a holder in due course. In most the assignee
had acquired the paper after maturity. Typical of them are Williams v. Weekley, 100 S.C. 28, 84 S.E. 299 (1914); Willoughby v. Ray, 131 S.C. 317, 127

S.E. 441 (1924).
3. 228 S.C. 201, 89 S.E. 2d 376 (1955).
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dicata] has been generally said to bar relitigation not only of issues
actually decided, but also of such issues as could have been presented
for decision, the application of the defensive bar to the latter rests,
strictly speaking, upon the doctrine of estoppel rather than that of
"4
res judicata.
Effect of Purchase by Mortgagor at Tax Sale
Adverse Possession by Mortgagee
The rather frequent problem of the effect of the purchase by the
mortgagee at a tax sale of the mortgaged property is presented in
Dunham v. Davis,5 as is also the usually related problem of adverse
possession by the mortgagee against the mortgagor. In this case
heirs of a mortgagor sought to recover property in possession of
the mortgagee. The answer set up title by virtue of a tax deed
and through adverse possession, and fell back upon the mortgage in
the event it should be held that the plaintiffs had an interest in the
property. In the trial of the case the presiding judge ruled against
the claim of title under the tax deed and left the issue of adverse
possession to the jury. The jury found in the defendant's favor
but the judge granted the plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The action of the lower court was affirmed.
After holding that the tax sale in question was invalid under applicable statutes (which are not relevant here), the court held that
apart from such considerations "the tax sale was ineffective, of itself,
to vest title in appellant, since he was a mortgagee and therefore his
purchase will be deemed to have been for the protection of his lien,
and not to have defeated respondents' title." 6
Failing thus in his assertion of title by acquisition of the property
at tax sale, the mortgagee claimed to have acquired it by adverse
possession, but the lower court's view of the facts was upheld on
4. It has been held that on a motion for a writ of assistance a defendant
cannot resist on grounds known to him at the time the report on sale was confirmed, and that he is concluded by the order of confirmation. LeConte v.
Irwin, 23 S.C. 106 (1884). Such an order operates as an estoppel. Murchison
v. Miller, 64 S.C. 425, 42 S.E. 177 (1902). It does not appear from the record
of the case under review whether there was an order of confirmation. The
failure to obtain an order of confirmation is no longer fatal to the finality of
a decree of sale, at least as to bona fide purchasers. § 10-1790, CODE or LAWS
OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952, and see Wooten v. Seanch, 187 S.C. 219, 196 S.E.
877 (1938). Such orders are not, however, eliminated by the statute, and it
may be assumed that once obtained they have the effect of conclusiveness as
to the validity of the sale.
5. 229 S.C. 29, 91 S.E. 2d 716 (1956).
6. Citing DeLaine v. DeLaine, 211 S.C. 223, 44 S.E. 2d 442 (1947). See
also Ham v. Flowers, 214 S.C. 212, 51 S.E. 2d 753, 7 A.L.R. 2d 1124 (1949),
and annotation 140 A.L.R. 294.
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the appeal. For although a mortgagee may perfect a title by adversd
possession "the adverse acts relied upon by the former must be suCh
as to give notice that he is claiming not as mortgagee but as owner."'
The facts necessary to constitute an adverse holding were not present
and the circumstances were on the whole compatible with rights a!
a mortgagee as distinguished from acts of ownership. The case was
remanded for purposes of the accounting which would be entailed
by reason of the outstanding mortgage interest.8

SURETYSHIP
Surety's Defense Arising from Act of Creditor

The case of City Lumber Company v. National Surety Corp.1"
is an interesting one of considerable novelty in this state- at
least as to the facts. The defendant was surety on a construction
bond, under which the contractor and surety were obligated to
pay for all labor, material and equipment. A painting subcontractor had bought material from the plaintiff on the purchase
of which a large balance was owed. The subcontractor, in need
of funds, and the plaintiff's manager urged the prime contractor
to make a payment to the subcontractor on his contract. A check
for more than the amount owing by the prime contractor to the subcontractor was drawn by the prime contractor payable to the joint
order of the subcontractor and the plaintiff and delivered to the subcontractor. The check bore a notation "advance on contract." The
subcontractor asked the plaintiff for permission to endorse its name
on the check, so that he might collect it and pay labor bills and
promised to make a substantial payment on the plaintiff's account.
On subsequent failure by the subcontractor and the prime contractor
to pay the account in full to the plaintiff, action was brought against
the surety, which defended on the grounds of payment, estoppel and
waiver. On a jury trial verdict was for the plaintiff. On appeal the
judgment below was reversed.
In reversing, the court did not rest its decision on the ground of
actual payment but concluded that the only reasonable inference
to be drawn from the circumstances was that the check had been
made out to the joint payees in order to enable the plaintiff to collect
7. Citing Ham v. Flowers, note 6, mspra; Knight v. Hilton, 224 S.C. 452, 79
S.E. 2d 871 (1954). See also Fogle v. Void, 223 S.C. 83, 74 S.E. 2d 358
(1952), where ownership was perfected by adverse possession.
8. The relationship of mortgagee in possession would involve a mutual accounting under the rules set out principally in Ham v. Flowers, note 6, supra,
and Knight v. Hilton, note 7, supra.
9. 229 S.C. 115, 92 S.E. 2d 128 (1956).
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its unpaid bills and that it was bound to have known that purpose.
The crux of the court's reasoning leading to the conclusion that on
that account the surety was relieved is to be found in the following
language: "The $3,500 check was given for the purpose of satisfying claims which the prime contractor and its surety were obligated
under the terms of the bond to pay. The source of the money was
known to the respondent. The surety was equitably entitled to the
discharge of the debts for which it was bound,9a but this was not
done because of the negligence of respondent in empowering [the
subcontractor] to use the funds for any purpose which he desired.
This is not a case of nonaction on the part of the creditor, but positive and affirmative action injuriously affecting the surety."'1
9a. The court evidently has in mind here the principle or an analogous one
which has found application in cases in which a creditor having two or more
claims against a principal receives money from the contract for which a surety
is bound and applies the payment to claims arising out of the other contract or
contracts. In South Carolina the cases seem to hold that such a payment to
the creditor is impressed with an equity in the surety's favor to have the funds
applied on the debt for which he is liable, certainly if the creditor knows the
source of payment. See Southern States Supply Co. v. Union Indemnity Co.,
161 S.C. 219, 159 S.E. 532 (1931); Boyce Plumbing Co. v. American Surety
Co., 162 S.C. 239, 160 S.E. 593 (1931). The result is not everywhere the same.
See generally, RESTATEMENT OV SECURITY, § 142; 41 A.L.R. 1297, supplemented
in 130 A.L.R. 198; 21 A.L.R. 704, supplemented in 49 A.L.R. 952, 60 A.L.R. 203.
10. The court here has reference to the ancient rule running through the
cases that a surety is not discharged by passivity or inaction on the part of the
creditor, and that "to effect the discharge of a surety, the act complained of on
the part of the creditor must be of a positive character or an omission to perform some act, when required by the surety, which equity enjoined upon him
and the omission of which proved injurious to the surety." Brannan v. Harris, 117
S.C. 423, 109 S.E. 396 (1921) ; Lang v. Brevard, 3 Strobhart's Equity E9 (S.C.
1849) ; Jackson v. Patrick, 10 S.C. 197 (1878). Thus indulgence to or failure
to sue the debtor is no defense to the surety. Witte v. Wolfe, 16 S.C. 256
(1881); Edwards v. Dargan, 30 S.C. 177, 8 S.E. 858 (1888); Gardner v.
Gardner, 23 S.C. 588 (1885) -a few of many such cases. And see RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY, § 130. But a binding extension of time without the surety's
consent discharges, either on the ground of alteration of the contract or inter-

ference with the right of subrogation.

Smith v. Tunno, 1 McCord's Equity

443 (S.C. 1826) ; Gardner v. Gardner, mspra; Providence Machine Co. v. Browning, 70 S.C. 148, 49 S.E. 325 (1904) ; RESTATEMENT OP SECURITY, § 129. The rule
here may vary as to a compensated surety, where the result will depend on the

extent to which the surety is injured. State A. & M. Society v. Taylor, 104 S.C.
167, 88 S.E. 372 (1915) ; RESTATEMENT Or SECURITY, § 129. And the creditor

is not compelled to accept security or additional security from the debtor.
Smith v. Tunno, supra; Falk v. Cruickshanks, 4 Richardson 243 (S.C. 1851) ;

Rouss v. King, 69 S.C. 168, 48 S.E. 220 (1903). But if the creditor releases or

surrenders a security or lien which he holds, the security is discharged to the extent of the value of the security surrendered. Smith v. Tunno, supra; Rouss

v. King, 74 S.C. 251, 54 S.E. 615 (1906) ; Twiggs v. Bank, 26 S.C. 612, 2 S.E.
698 (1886); Greenville v. Ormand, 51 S.C. 121, 28 S.E. 147 (1897) ; RESTATE-

=NT Or SEcuRITY, § 132. A failure by the creditor to retain percentages contracted for is treated variously as alteration of contract, as release of security, or as a positive act causing injury to the surety, the theory, however, being

important in determining the extent of the surety's discharge. Greenville v.
Ormand, sup&; Mack Mnfg. Co. v. Mass. B. & I. Co., 114 S.C. 207, 103
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Having determined that for the reasons given the surety was discharged, the court proceeded to broaden the holding in these words:
No case has been cited, and we have found none in our
own research, involving the precise question before us, but
we think applicable to some extent is the general rule that
where the creditor has within his control funds of the principal debtor which may properly be applied toward the payment of the obligation, but fails to do so, the surety is discharged. See annotation in 115 Amer. St. Reports, beginning
on page 95; 50 Am. Jur., Suretyship, Sec. 116. In Commercial
National Bank v. Henninger, 105 Pa. 496, the court said: "The
rule is well settled that 'when a creditor has in his hands the
means of paying his debt out of the property of his principal
debtor, and does not use it, but gives it up, the surety is discharged. It need not be actually in the hands of his creditor;
if it be within his control, so that by the exercise of reasonable
diligence he may have realized his pay out of it, yet voluntarily
and by supine negligence relinquished it, the surety is discharged'."
It seems to this writer that the statements just made, and particularly that quoted from the Pennsylvania case, go too far unless
qualified and would appear to commit the South Carolina court to
views at variance with its own intimation in the present case that
there must be an equity in the funds in favor of the surety and that
the act complained of must be positive in its character and not simply
an act of omission. In the annotation mentioned, in which the Cominercial National Bank case is cited, there is this restrictive language:
"But in order to make it incumbent upon the creditor to apply
funds or property in his possession upon the debt of the principal,
the creditor must have some such lien on or interest in the property
or fund that it is charged with a trust in favor of the surety." Identical language is used in the section in American Jurisprudence which
S.E. 499 (1919) (compensated surety): Pickens County v. National Surety
Co., 13 Fed. 2d 758 (C.C.A. 4 Cir., W.D.S.C. 1926) (compensated surety).
But failure to enforce the security will not discharge the surety. Wayne v.
Kirby, 2 Bailey 551 (S.C. 1831); Miller v. White, 25 S.C. 235 (1886). The
rule may be different as to pledqed property because of the duty owed by the
pledgee to the pledgor. See Montague v. Stelts, 37 S.C. 200, 15 S.E. 968,

34 Am. St. Rep. 736 (1891) ; annotation 51 A.L.R. 609. The creditor's failure
or delay in recording a mortgage securing the debt for which the surety is

liable, absent a demand by the surety that he do so, will not discharge the
surety either wholly or pro tanto to the extent of the loss. Arthur v. Brown,
91 S.C. 316, 74 S.E. 652 (1912) ; Brannan v. Harris, mspra. There are views

elsewhere to the contrary. See, annotation 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 699; RtsTATE5I'&NT OV SECURITY, § 132.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1956

5

1956]

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1956], Art. 20

SuRVEY OV SOUTH CAROLINA LAW

is referred to. Since the reservation to the rule is as well established
as the rule itself, and just as in the sources of reference mentioned it
accompanies the statement of the rule, it may well be that the court
treats the statement of the reservation as unnecessary or as implicit.
The matter is thus dealt with in Stearns, Law of Suretyship :11
A surety cannot claim his discharge in every instance when
the creditor voluntarily relinquishes property of the principal which he holds. His right to discharge requires that the
property be so placed that the creditor is bound to hold it in
special trust to pay the particular debt for which the surety is
liable. It is not enough that the creditor has in his possession
the means of satisfying the debt, but he must have the right,
conferred upon him by law or contract, to so apply the property.
If the creditor holds funds of the principal arising out of some
other transaction, he need not apply the funds to the debt for
which the surety is liable, but may pay the principal and proceed against the surety. The creditor's right of set-off against
' 12
the principal is one that he may use or not, as he chooses."
The language quoted from the Pennsylvania case does not carry
qualifying language and is used to support the conclusion in that
case that when a bank fails to appropriate the deposit of a debtor
whose debt to it is secured by the obligation of a surety, the surety is
discharged. On this point the cases are in conflict, but the majority
view is that the bank is under no duty to a surety or endorser to
make such an appropriation- that it has the power but not the duty.
The Pennsylvania cases, including this one, fall in the minority. 13
It is in the bank cases that most of the problems involving the appli14
cation of the rule relied on by the court in the instant case arise.
A technical reason frequently advanced in support of the majority
view is that, although the bank may set off or appropriate, the surety
11. 5th Ed. (1951), § 6.51.
12. See also, as stating one aspect of this rule RESTATEMIENT OF SECURITY,
§ 143: "Where the creditor is indebted to a principal whose duty to the
creditor is secured by the obligation of a surety, payment of his indebtedness
by the creditor to the principal before or after maturity of the principal's duty
does not discharge the surety."
13. See annotation 70 A.L.R. 339.
14. See

RESTATEMENT

OF SECURITY, § 143, which follows the majority rule

as to bank deposits and sets out the exceptions. One exception seems to be
where the note is payable at the bank, Stearns, op. cit. § 6.51. There are no
South Carolina cases dealing specifically with the effect on a surety of a bank's
failure to appropriate the principal's deposit, but there is a fringe treatment
of the matter in Bank of Spartanburg v. Mahon, 78 S.C. 490, 59 S.E. 31
(1907), and a dictum approving discharge of the surety in Greenville v. Ormand, note 10, szupra, at page 128 of 51 S.C., citing a Delaware case which
treats the bank's right of set-off as a lien and failure to appropriate the deposit as a surrender of security.
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has no interest in the deposit to which he would be subrogated on
payment by him. 15
The qualified rule finds support in a South Carolina case of some
age. In Beaubien v. Stoney,16 a surety sued on a note pleaded discharge because the payee who owed the principal on a building contract paid him on the contract before its completion. The contention
was "that by the terms of the building contract, the defendant was
entitled to hold the whole price of the work until it should be finished, and, therefore, held a security in his hands, which, to the extent of the sums above mentioned, he parted from, and thereby
discharged the plaintiff." The court, after pointing out that the contract on which payment to the principal had been made was independent of the contract on which the surety was bound, dismissed
the surety's contention, saying: "The surety, in order to claim a
discharge, must have some connexion [sic] with the money paid
over, or security parted from."'1 7 Clearly then, accepting this last
statement as South Carolina law, the court's statement in the present
case touching the creditor's control of the debtor's funds must be
trimmed to meet the law in the Beaubien case. In any event the
result does fit that principle because of the court's prior pronouncement of the surety's equity attaching to the fund in the creditor's
hands.
Another reason announced by the court in support of its finding
for the surety was that the creditor's acts brought the case under the
"well established principle that where one of two innocent parties
must suffer a loss, it must be borne by that one of them, who, by
8
his conduct, has rendered the injury possible.'
There is a dissent by the Chief Justice taking issue with the majority statement that the only inference to be drawn was that the
check in question had been made payable to the co-payees to enable
the plaintiff to collect its claim. There is further dissent with respect
to the issue of estoppel arising out of negligence and the application
of the "two innocent parties" principle.
15. Davenport v. State Banking Co., 126 Ga. 136, 54 S.E. 977, 8 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 944, 115 Am. St. Rep. 68, 7 Ann. Cas. 1000 (1906).
16. Sneers' Equity 508 (S.C. 1844).
17. This case is commented on and differentiated in Greenville v. Ormand,

note 10 a, supra, at page 128 of 51 S.C. It is also cited in STEARNS, LAW o1:
SUR TYsHIP as supporting the qualified rule as quoted here in the text, and also
in SinPsoN ON SURETYSHIP (1951) § 76, in the same manner.
18. For a case in which a creditor was estopped by conduct, see Pittsburgh
Steel Co. v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 55 F. Supp. 36 (E.D. S.C. 1948),
where creditor at request of sub-contractor furnished prime contractor with
affidavit that all claims it held against the sub-contractor had been paid (where
in fact they had not) and the prime contractor thereupon relinquished retained
percentages,
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